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This paper presents a game theory model of the 
strategic interaction between Khartoum and Juba 
leading up to the referendum on Sudan’s partition in 
2011. The findings show that excessive militarization 
and brinksmanship is a rational response for both 
actors, neither of which can credibly commit to lower 
levels of military spending under the current status 
quo. This militarization is often at the expense of 
health and education expenditures, suggesting that the 
opportunity cost of militarization is foregone economic 
development. These credibility issues might be resolved 
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by democratization, increased transparency, reduction 
of information asymmetries, and efforts to promote 
economic and political cooperation. The paper explores 
these devices, demonstrating how they can contribute to 
Pareto preferred outcomes in equilibrium. The authors 
characterize the military expenditure associated with 
the commitment problem experienced by both sides, 
estimate its costs from data for Sudan, and identify the 
opportunity cost of foregone development implied by 
continued, excessive, and unsustainable militarization. 
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  1Non-Technical Executive summary 
 
This paper presents a simple game-theoretic framework to analyze the potential impact 
on peace in Sudan of the 2011 self-determination referendum to be made by the people of 
the south as envisaged by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). We highlight and 
discuss several policy implications for the key political actors in the Sudan, most notably 
the two ruling parties, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudanese Peoples 
Liberation Movement (SPLM), as well as the international community.  
 
In our model, the South (Juba) makes the first move by deciding whether to pursue 
independence or remain part of a unified Sudan, on the basis of its expectation of the 
North’s (Khartoum) response. We assume that both sides prefer the status quo (peace 
with unity) to the re-ignition of conflict.  This fundamental assumption is justified by the 
fact that both sides had signed the CPA and subsequently became leading partners in the 
government, reflecting their preference for peace.  Under these assumptions, Juba does 
not opt for partition if Khartoum can credibly threaten war.  It is important to keep in 
mind throughout this paper that a threat of conflict in this model need not be explicit or 
realized conflict, and therefore, may not manifest as an outright violation of the peace 
agreement.  Instead, these threats could be through a variety of signaling devices, 
including increased military expenditure.  Khartoum’s response is determined by a cost-
benefit calculation: if the expected benefits from responding with war to Juba’s bid for 
independence are higher than the expected costs, Khartoum will send a signal that it 
might resort to arms.  Oil fields in Unity State and Upper Nile, and may be Abyei as well, 
which might otherwise go to the South under partition are identified here as the spoils of 
war.  Almost all of these oil fields happen to be close to the North-South borders (see the 
map in Appendix Figure 1).  If Khartoum can expect to secure a threshold percentage of 
the oil fields through conflict, then they would signal that they might prefer war to a 
peaceful partition. However, should war happen, and we are not suggesting that it will, 
military success requires that Khartoum incur a cost by spending in the military.   
Moreover, should it choose to mount a military response, Khartoum will also have to 
incur an additional cost proportional to Juba’s military expenditure.  On the other hand, 
Juba’s military expenditure could be thought of as a deterrent to the hypothetical military 
response by Khartoum in defense of self-determination.  Therefore, both Khartoum and 
Juba have incentives for very high levels of military expenditure to reach their preferred 
outcomes.  While this military expenditure may be a perfectly rational response for both 
actors, this militarization is not made in a vacuum and comes from the same budgets that 
provides public goods and service delivery, so military spending is often made at the 
expense of development opportunities that are being foregone. Therefore anything that 
can be done to increase the commitment of both actors toward peace can be framed as a 
development activity.   
 
In the basic specification of our model, we assume perfect information and therefore rule 
out the possibility that Juba pursue independence under the incorrect expectation that 
Khartoum would acquiesce, thus inadvertently provoking war. In this context, both sides 
have incentives to manipulate the expected costs and benefits of a hypothetical military 
confrontation, for example by increasing military spending. Thus, high military 
  2expenditures by Juba could reduce Khartoum’s benefits from war and therefore reduce its 
incentives to violently retaliate in case of partition. At the same time, Khartoum has an 
incentive to invest in the military so as to improve its potential benefits from a 
hypothetical war and thus discourage Juba’s bid for independence.  
 
In the second specification of the model, we relax the assumption about perfect 
information, allowing for uncertainty, on Juba’s part, about Khartoum’s expected gains 
from war and consequently about its response to a pro-independence vote. In this 
situation Khartoum has an interest in signaling a high payoff associated with war, thus 
discouraging Juba from pursuing partition. However, Khartoum’s signals would lack 
credibility because Juba knows that its adversary would have an incentive to misrepresent 
its incentive structure to discourage partition. In this specification of our model there is a 
risk of inadvertent war.  An even more dire scenario is characterized by a combination of 
imperfect information and significantly increased military expenditures by both sides, 
which may move both actors beyond their preference for peace.  In this case an additional 
risk of war emerges; where beside pushing both sides to misallocate scarce economic 
resources, an arms race between Khartoum and Juba would risk generating a security 
dilemma, in which each actor sees the other’s efforts to arm as potentially aggressive and 
may be tempted to launch a preventive attack for fear of being attacked in a moment of 
relative weakness. 
 
The moral of the model at this juncture is that both sides are likely to engage in an arm 
race not because they prefer war to the status quo, rather because each side uses military 
expenditure as a signaling device.  Khartoum would like to deter Juba from casting the 
partition vote, while Juba endeavors to make a military response by Khartoum as costly 
as possible. While tractability requires a focus on a quantitative metric like military 
expenditure, the predictions of the model can be generalized to include other means that 
increase costs, such as mobilizing allies within the other side’s regional powerbase.   
Indeed, both the NCP and the SPLM have exploited this option in the past during the 
civil war. For example, the NCP has trained, funded and armed tribal Southern Sudanese 
militias opposed to the SPLM, while the latter attempted to bring the war to the north 
through recruitment of fighters and building of military and political alliances with 
rebellious northern groups in Darfur and Eastern Sudan.   
 
Because development is the opportunity cost of this militarization by both sides, the 
international community could have a positive role to play here and has clear incentives 
for intervention.  Encouraging commitment to the peace process for both sides can 
decrease incentives for militarization and contribute to development.  The international 
community could encourage this commitment by providing support to the completion of 
the CPA-mandated agenda, such as the demarcation of North-South borders; the census; 
the resolution of the disputed Abyei region; and other technical issues related to the 
general elections of 2009.  We demonstrate how these basic steps can contribute to 
credible commitments by both actors. Moreover, urging more transparency on both sides’ 
military expenditures can reduce information asymmetries and thus the risk of war by 
miscalculation. 
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affected by a process of democratization of Sudanese politics (including the 2009 
elections).  Democratization is shown in the model to provide a useful commitment 
device and to resolve some of the credibility issues that are currently contributing to 
excessive militarization by both sides, resulting in the possibility of unwanted and 
unintended conflict.  The reduction in the equilibrium level of military expenditure 
associated with democratization would free resources to be spent on development, 
represented by the MDGs.  Our simulations suggest that the payoff for both peace and 
development in the Sudan could be very large.  First, large savings can be achieved by 
even modest reductions in military expenditures; and, second, the returns of expenditure 
on the social sector is likely to generate significant progress in terms of the MDGs 
targets, given the very low standards of human development in Sudan, especially in the 
South.  Democratization is also likely to have much more significant impact beyond its 
positive influence associated with reduced military expenditure.  A genuine democratic 
transformation might actually make unity attractive to Southern Sudanese; and even if the 
latter opted for partition, the two emerging democracies are likely to assign a higher 
value to economic interdependence and cooperation than any payoffs that might be 
reaped by conflicts and war.  Moreover, democratization may be a precondition for a 
range of other initiatives that have been proposed for enhancing economic 
interdependence and cooperation.   
 
Finally, we explore a range of initiatives for peaceful coexistence and cooperation and 
demonstrate how these extensions alter the payoffs for both sides.  These include 
enhanced economic inter-dependence through the oil sector, trade, accommodations for 
nomadic northern Sudanese tribes and Southern Sudanese living in the North; a 
cooperative Confederal option; and a neutral Abyei zone as an investment in peace.   
 
The fundamental implication of our model is that increasing, unsustainable and 
dangerous militarization is a rational response to the status quo and will continue so long 
as there is no progress toward democratization.  Genuine democratic transformation may 
be a necessary condition for credible commitments from both actors even if it is only for 
the pragmatic goal of preventing conflict and war between the two emerging Sudanese 
states.  Likewise, following on signals from the SPLM, it appears that there is little 
chance for the more ambitious goal of a united Sudan without a genuine democratic 
transformation leading to a more democratic federalized political order entailing 
substantial realignments of political and economic powers towards the South and other 
marginalized regions of Sudan.  This assessment has far reaching implications for the 
international community’s approach to the peace processes in Sudan, be they north-south 
or Darfur. We contend that the international community should promote a wider process 
of political dialogue in the country as increased political enfranchisement may be the 
only way to build missing credibility in the commitment to peace from both Khartoum 
and Juba  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In 2011, the people of Southern Sudan will participate in a popular referendum on 
independence, as agreed to in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, 
ending Africa’s longest civil war
1.   The CPA was signed by the (then) Government of 
Sudan, represented by the National Congress Party (NCP), and the Sudan’s Peoples 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the rebel movement fighting the government 
since 1983.  The de facto one-party state rule of the NCP following the National Islamic 
Front’s coup of June 1989
2 represents the interest of the military-security establishment 
but also espouses an Islamist pan-Arab agenda.   The SPLM is largely, but not 
exclusively, based on the dominantly animist and Christian non-Arab Southern Sudan; it 
has, not surprisingly, emphasized the African heritage of Sudan and called for a secular 
democratic “new Sudan”.  
Ushering an end to a long and bloody civil war involving two ambitious political 
organizations with two radically different visions for the country, the birth of the CPA 
has been a difficult process, resulting in a complex and elaborate agreement
3.   It contains 
protocols covering the provisions for the referendum; security arrangements; wealth and 
power sharing; resolution of conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States- two 
                                                 
1 The Sudanese civil war had started in 1955, even before the full independence of the country one year 
later, and was interrupted by a ten year peace following the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1972 
between the military government of General Numeri and the South Sudan Ana Nya Rebel movement, 
which granted South Sudan regional autonomy.   However, this peace agreement collapsed in 1983, 
ushering the second phase of the insurgency led by the Sudan’s Peoples Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A); (for further review of the Sudanese civil war, see, for example, Ali, Elbadawi  and El-Batahani 
(2005) and references cited therein).  
2The National Islamic Front is a political party formed by the “Islamic Movement”, led by Hassan Al-
Turabi, in 1985 prior to the national elections that led to the formation of the third Sudanese democratic 
government (1986-89). 
3 A current map of Sudan, north/south states, the proposed borders and boundaries associated with the 
referendum and the disputed area of Abyei is shown in Appendix Figure 1. 
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political influence; and resolving the status of Abyei, a disputed oil-rich region between 
North and South, which had often times witnessed violent conflicts between nomadic 
Northern and Southern tribes over water and grazing areas
4.   The CPA has so far led, 
among other accomplishments, to the appointment of a government of National Unity 
(GNU) dominated by the NCP (52%) and the SPLM (28%); the establishment of a 
government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), dominated by the SPLM, with authority in the 
South; and the implementation of an oil revenue sharing formula, which applies to the oil 
produced in the South.  This formula allocates 2% of the net revenues from this oil to 
Southern producing states, leaving the remainder 98% to be equally shared by the GNU 
and the GOSS. 
However, and despite the elaborate implementation modalities detailed in various 
protocols annexed to the CPA, little or no progress has been made on key areas, such as 
demarcation of the borders between North and South, a population census and the 
repatriation of the internally displaced Southern Sudanese
5.  Lack of progress on these 
areas casts doubts on the prospects for holding the mid-term general election in 2009, a 
critical step in the democratic transition, judged to be necessary for providing popular 
legitimacy to the CPA and for promoting the option of unity for Southern Sudanese in the 
referendum of 2011- so called “making unity attractive”
6.   Moreover, the NCP and the 
                                                 
4 As this working paper is being revised a tentative agreement (the “Abyei Roadmap”) on Abyei has been 
signed (June 8, 2008) – which includes provisions for replacing military forces in the area with fresh units 
that do not have histories of conflict in the region, increased access for UNMIS, transparent civil 
administration of the region and return of displaced persons. 
5 See various CPA Monitor reports by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) at www.unmis.org.  Also see Ali 
(2007) for an analysis of the implementation issues regarding the wealth-sharing component of the CPA. 
6 The making “unity attractive” was a phrase coined by the late SPLM leader Dr. John Garang, which 
suggests that Southern Sudanese would be persuaded to cast the unity vote, should the Northern Sudanese 
demonstrate commitment to the ideals of the “new Sudan”, espoused by the SPLM and its late leader.   
  6SPLM have been locked in bitter disputes about demarcation of the North-South borders, 
especially near oil fields; the transparency of operations in the oil sector
7; the population 
census; redeployment of forces; and the status of Abyei
8.  These issues threaten to be the 
thorniest challenges facing the two partners (ICG, 2008).  These difficulties, in addition 
to differences between the two partners regarding resolving the conflict in Darfur
9 were 
cited among the main factors behind the decision by the SPLM in October 2007 to 
suspend participation in the GNU.  However, with active mediation by the US and other 
external actors, just two months later the two parties were able to resolve their disputes 
and return to the GNU, with the exception of the Abyei issue, which will be directly 
addressed by the Presidency
10.  Consequently the SPLM has decided to resume its 
participation in the GNU.  Nonetheless, this crisis demonstrates the precarious nature of 
the Sudanese peace process and the importance of long-term strategic planning to avoid 
similar crises in the future.  While the CPA may have been instrumental in bringing about 
the end of the war, the recent crisis demonstrates that even the most exhaustive 
                                                 
7 See Deng (2007a,b) for a perspective from GOSS and the SPLM.    
8 The CPA calls for the resolution of the Abyei problem in two steps.  First, a boundary commission would 
determine the boundary of the district as well as whether it belongs to the north or south; and, second, the 
Southern Sudanese Dinka people of Abyei will decide in a referendum whether to be part of the south or 
the north.  The boundary commission has ruled that the district belongs to the South and that the north-
south border in that area should be adjusted accordingly.  While the SPLM has accepted the committee’s 
ruling and considers it binding, the NCP has rejected it, arguing that the Commission has surpassed its 
mandate.  It is pertinent to note that what makes this matter so complicated is that the Messeriya, the main 
northern tribe who has lived side by side with the Dinka in Abyei for centuries, are adamantly opposed to 
the Commission’s ruling.   Moreover, almost all of the northern Sudanese political parties, though critical 
of the NCP monopoly over the CPA, also remain sympathetic to the Messerya’s position.  See footnote 4 
for recent progress on Abyei. 
9 While the NCP and the SPLM were heavily engaged in the negotiations leading to the CPA, a new 
insurgency erupted in 2003 in Darfur, the far western region of northern Sudan.  This new civil war has 
touched off an international uproar due to the high number of civilian casualties; the vicious inter-
communal violence associated with it and the massive scale of internally and externally displaced 
populations. It has been viewed with a lot of concern from the perspective of its corrosive effects on the 
CPA.  (For analysis and assessment of the prospects for peaceful resolution of the Darfur conflict, see, for 
example, Ahmed and Elbadawi (2008).) 
10The Presidency, as stipulated in the CPA, is composed of the President of the Republic, the First Vice 
President and the Vice President.  Though the President and his VP come from the NCP, the First VP, 
nominated by the SPLM, enjoys a veto power on all key decisions.  See footnote 4 for recent progress. 
  7agreement may not be sufficient to maintain the peace, much less make “unity 
attractive”
11.  Instead, it appears that the referendum is more likely to lead to a vote for 
independence and a consequent partitioning of the country.  Worse still, the Sudan may 
not even enjoy a “peaceful divorce”, given the disputes over oil sites and the status of 
Abyei. 
Therefore, the referendum will be a crucial political moment for the fragile 
country and, if freely and fairly executed, it will constitute an unprecedented move 
toward self-governance in the region, regardless of the outcome.  In light of this 
momentous, impending occasion, this paper asks how the strategic actors in Sudan and 
the international community can best contribute to a welfare maximizing solution, using a 
simple game theoretic approach to capture the importance of timing and noise in the 
decision by the people of the South on partition and the response from the people of the 
North.  The pivotal question is whether the NCP, the dominant partner in the Government 
of National Unity in Khartoum, can truly “make unity attractive” or will settle to simply 
“make an offer that cannot be refused”.   
  This paper is not meant to be an exhaustive description of the extremely 
complicated issue of partition nor is the use of game theory intended to trivialize the very 
important dilemmas facing the country. Rather, it is hoped that the use of a simple model 
to represent North-South interactions will prompt thoughtful discussion on the 
importance of credible commitments for peace in Sudan.  In the following sections we 
                                                 
11 In a recent policy brief, John Prendergast and Roger Winter (2008) argue the burden of making “unity 
attractive” should rests overwhelmingly with the NCP, which should take a number of steps to ensure 
genuine power sharing and faithful implementation of the CPA; real resolution of the Darfur crisis; clear 
and lasting commitment to equality among all Sudanese citizens; free and fair elections; and prudent and 
equitable management of public money, especially from the oil, to create a tangible peace dividend for the 
whole of Sudan, including the South. 
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accommodate issues such as military expenditure by both sides, incomplete information 
and a possible democratization process.  We also discuss some instruments for enhancing 
economic and social interdependence between North and South that might increase the 
cost of conflicts for both sides and, hence, reduce the chances of a military response by 
Khartoum to a partition vote by Juba.  These include consideration of confederation 
between North and South in lieu of outright partition to promote overall economic and 
political cooperation; turning Abyei into a neutral region governed by local tribes from 
both sides; enhancing economic interdependence through the oil sector, trade and 
transportation networks; and allowing the large Southern Sudanese community to remain 
in the North if they choose to do so, while providing continued access to the Arab 
nomadic tribes into the South during the summer. We conclude with a discussion of the 
policy implications for strategies of both actors and the international community. 
 
2.  A Game of Referendum and Response 
In the most basic form of the game of referendum and response there are two actors by 
the names of Juba and Khartoum, representing the ruling elites of South and North 
Sudan, respectively
12.  By simplifying the decision-making processes of both groups of 
                                                 
12 The popular legitimacy of both parties currently controlling these two sides, especially the NCP, is 
vigorously contested by other political forces.  Were a bona fide fair and transparent general elections and a 
referendum to take place, the emerging leadership would have the legitimate claim to speak for the people 
in their respective regions.  However, it is very likely that the game as represented here will be substantially 
influenced by the actions of the current partners well before the elections.     
  9people into two actors, issues of collective action and conflicting interests within each 
group are assumed away for simplicity, admittedly at the expense of realism
13.    
Juba acts first, deciding through the referendum on independence whether to 
secede or not.  In Figure 1, these two strategies are shown in the light grey boxes as 
“Partition” or “Unity”.  If Juba chooses partition, Khartoum is given the chance to 
respond, with either war or peace.  The strategies for Khartoum are represented by the 
grey boxes labeled “War” or “Peace”.  The payoffs for each actor are defined by the CPA 
and some assumptions on the costs and objectives of war.  The following terms constitute 
the payoffs for the game: 
 
A = Tax revenue to Khartoum based on CPA defined borders, 0<A 
B = Tax revenue to Juba based on CPA defined borders, 0<B 
R = Petroleum revenues, 0<R 
MK, MJ = Military expenditures by Khartoum and Juba 
δ = Share of petroleum revenues (land) that Khartoum can secure through war, positively 
related to military expenditures by Khartoum (MK) and negatively related to military 
expenditures by Juba (MJ). 
γMJ , γMK = Cost of war for Khartoum and Juba, respectively (for simplicity, assumed to 
be directly proportional to the other actor’s military expenditures).
14 
  
Currently, under the CPA in Sudan, the governments of the North and South receive tax 
revenues from their region and income from an oil-revenue sharing agreement
15.  Under 
                                                 
13 In particular, this assumption does not account for the widely known division within the SPLM between 
the “southern nationalists”, who tend to favor a southern-first strategy and concentrate on the 2011 
referendum; and those who support the unity of the country under the vision of their founding late leader 
Dr. John Garang.  While the first group is committed to self determination for the south leading to the 
partition of the country, the latter would like to challenge the NCP through forging of alliances with what 
they consider as the marginalized majority of the north.   However, given the prevailing political conditions 
it is widely anticipated that at least a plurality of Southern Sudanese are in favor of partition.   Moreover, 
this assumption is relaxed a little later in the paper when we consider democratic representation as a 
commitment device in the context of the 2009 elections.   
14 An alternative specification might include differentiating the costs of conflict for both actors, γKMJ and 
γJMK.  This specification would accommodate the different costs associated with conflict for both actors 
and perhaps reflect the principal-agent problem between population and government, elected or otherwise, 
when it comes to waging war (We are indebted to Phil Keefer for this suggestion).  The costs of war could 
also be expressed as a function of the intervention of the international community in favor of either side, as 
illustrated below. 
  10the CPA, 2% of net Southern oil revenue is allocated to the state or region where the oil 
is produced and the remainder is split evenly between the Government of National Unity 
(GNU) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS).  To simplify matters, the state 
income is assumed away and oil revenues under unification are split evenly (R/2).  Thus, 
under unity the expected payoff to Khartoum is tax revenue plus oil less military 
expenditures (A+(R/2)-MK) and the expected payoff to Juba is tax revenue plus oil less 
military expenditures (B+(R/2)-MJ). 
  In the event of partition and peaceful response from Khartoum, the expected 
payoff is simply tax revenues for Khartoum less military expenditures (A-MK) and tax 
and oil revenues for Juba less military expenditures (B+R-MJ).  These payoffs reflect the 
fact that the majority of oil is located in the South (Upper Nile State) or in contentious 
border areas (e.g. Unity and South Kordofan States or the Abyei region).  These 
assumptions are made for simplicity and are not intended to reflect the actual disposition 
of these areas. 
  If Khartoum responds to a vote for independence with war, then the payoff for 
Khartoum is A+ δR-  γMJ  -MK and for Juba the payoff is B+(1-δ)R-  γMK  – MJ.  In 
addition to the non-oil tax revenues (A,B) and costs of conflict (MK, MJ), war results in 
some share (δ) of the oil resources (R) secured by Khartoum through the war and the cost 
of conflict based on military expenditures by the other actor (γMJ, γMK).  This assumption 
suggests that, in the event of a military response to a partition vote, Khartoum is likely to 
focus its military campaign on the oil-rich areas close to the border between North and 
South, especially those that might be considered by Khartoum as part of the North.   
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Strictly speaking, the CPA stipulates that the federal revenues collected by GOSS in the South should be 
equally shared with the central government in Khartoum.  However, we abstract from this level of detail, 
since it will not affect the arithmetic of the game.  
  11Therefore, the likely military response by Khartoum will not aim at restoring the full 
unity of the country.  This assumption is consistent with the widely held view that the oil 
belt, including Abyei is likely to be the flashpoints for any future North-South conflict 
(e.g. ICG, 2008).  
Assumption on the Preference for Peace:  In 2005, both sides signed the CPA, ending a 
civil war that had been fought on and off for almost forty years.  To reflect this 
preference for peace, it is assumed that the benefits of the peace agreement exceed any 
gains that either side would enjoy from conflict (formally, this is reflected by the 
constraint:  δR+γMK >R/2> δR- γMJ).  While this is consistent with the signing of the 
CPA it may be a strong assumption that may no longer hold (see discussion of military 
expenditure below).  
In this extensive form dynamic (sequential) game described above and shown in 
Figure 1, Juba is faced with a backwards induction problem.  How can Juba maximize its 
payoff, knowing that Khartoum will respond to its choice?  To solve this backwards 
induction problem, consider the values of the payoffs for both actors, given the three 
outcomes.  Assuming that all five terms are positive, the payoffs for each actor have a 
preference ordering as follows: 
 
Khartoum A+(R/2)-MK >  A+  δR- γMJ -MK >  <  A-MK 
Juba   B+R-MJ > B+(R/2)-MJ   >  B+(1-δ)R-γMK –MJ 
  
 
Under the assumptions above, Khartoum prefers unity to war or a peaceful partition and 
Juba prefers partition to unity and unity to war.  Khartoum’s preferences between war 
and peaceful partition are unspecified – the analysis below demonstrates that the 
equilibrium obtained depends entirely upon this preference by Khartoum. 
  12Given these preference orderings and the assumptions above, Juba’s first choice 
would be any strategy set that will result in peaceful partition.  Khartoum, meanwhile, 
would prefer any strategy set that would result in unity.  Is it possible for Juba to force a 
peaceful partition on Khartoum?  
Figure 1:  Extensive Form Model of Referendum and 
Response 
Unity  Partition 
Response [Khartoum]  Khartoum A+(R/2)-MK 
Juba   B+(R/2)-MJ 
Khartoum A-MK 
Juba   B+R-MJ 
Peace  War 
Khartoum A+  δR- γMJ -MK 
Juba   B+(1-δ)R-γMK –MJ 
Referendum [Juba] 
 
If the gains from conflict (δR) are greater than the costs of conflict (γMJ), then 
Khartoum will prefer war to peace as a response to partition
16.  If this is the case, then 
Juba can solve the sub-game of Khartoum’s response and anticipate that Khartoum will 
prefer war to peace in the event of partition.  In this case, Juba has a choice between the 
payoffs under Partition-War or Unity.  Under the preference for peace assumption, Juba 
                                                 
16 Even if Khartoum is not actually planning to go to war and intends to comply with the CPA, it can 
attempt to deter Juba from choosing the option of partition by signaling its preference for the war option. 
  13would prefer unity to war (R/2>(1-δ)R-γMK).  In this scenario, Khartoum has a credible 
threat of war and Juba’s only rational choice for the referendum is unity, despite their 
preference for peaceful partition.   
If, however, the gains from conflict are less than the costs of conflict (δR< γMJ), 
then Khartoum prefers peace to war in the event of partition.  Following the same logic as 
above, Juba can use backwards induction to anticipate Khartoum’s response to a vote for 
partition as peace.  The two choices in this case would be between the payoffs of 
Partition-Peace and Unity.  Following the preference ordering above, Juba prefers the 
payoff under Partition-Peace over that of Unity.  In this case, because Khartoum has no 
credible threat of war, Juba can provoke a peaceful partition through a referendum vote. 
These results are presented in Table 1, below. 
 
Table 1:  Payoffs from Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria for the Game of Referendum 
and Response 
  δR> γMJ  δR< γMJ 
Khartoum A+(R/2)-MK A-MK 
Juba B+(R/2)-MJ B+R-MJ 
 
As these results show, the Nash equilibrium solutions depend entirely on expected 
costs and gains from conflict.  Of course, these are simplified payoffs and objective 
functions and the reader is cautioned to remember that the opportunity cost of military 
spending is often development.  In this respect the costs of conflict, actual or threatened, 
are underestimated in this model.  In the next section we discuss the impact of military 
expenditure and other actions by both actors in determining these parameters.   
 
2.1 Military Expenditure and Other Investments in Credible Threat 
  14In this model it is the relative values of the costs of conflict (γMJ) and the gains 
from war (δR) that determine whether Khartoum’s threat of war is credible.  Assuming 
that δ is a function of MK and MJ, both actors are able to affect these costs and benefits 
through military spending
17.  For all γ>0 military spending by each side increases the 
costs of conflict for the other actor.  We assume a unique equilibrium levels of 




J.  In terms of the model 
presented in Figure 1, these levels of expenditure would be set in a “pre-game” stage 




J as if they were going to war (following the logic that 
both must have credible threats of conflict developed in the previous section)
18.   
This relationship between military expenditure and the costs and gains from war 
is graphically illustrated by locating the preferences orderings from above on to two 
number lines in Figure 2.   
                                                 
17 This relationship defining δ could take a functional form such as a contest success function, following 
Hirshleifer (1991) and Skaperdas (1996).   
18 In this case, both agents maximize their payouts from war, given their opponents expected payouts, 
resulting in solutions that satisfy the first order conditions δ′=1/R for Khartoum and (1-δ)′=1/R for Juba.  




J are unique and positive. 
  15B+(R/2)-M*J  B+R-M*J  B+(1-δ)R-γM*K –M*J 
←MK 
     MJ → 
MK → 
← MJ  
A+ δR- γM*J –M*K  A-M*K  A+(R/2)-M*K 
Juba 
Khartoum 
Figure 2:  Military Expenditure Effect on Payoffs 
Increased Military Expenditure by Khartoum = MK↑ → δ↑  
Increased Military Expenditure by Juba = MJ↑ →  δ↓  
 
 
On the first number line, reflecting Khartoum’s payoffs, military expenditure by 
Khartoum can move the payoff for war up and above the payoff from peaceful partition 
(as shown in the figure), ensuring that the threat of conflict is credible.  Meanwhile, 
military expenditures by Juba could reduce this payoff for Khartoum through two 
channels:  share of resources secured through war (δR) and costs of conflict proportional 
to military expenditure by Juba (γMJ).  These expenditures by Juba decrease the expected 
payoff from war for Khartoum.  Conceivably, very high spending by Juba could reduce 
the payoff to Khartoum below that of peaceful partition.  Such spending by Juba is a 
deterrent, reducing the credibility of Khartoum’s threat of conflict.  Similarly, increased 
military spending by Juba moves the payoff from war to the right for Juba on the second 
number line and spending by Khartoum on the military moves the payoff for Juba to the 
left on the number line.  Conceivably, very high levels of expenditure by Juba vis-à-vis 
  16low spending by Khartoum and a low level of γ could result in Juba preferring war to 
unity, but we assume away this possibility with the preference for peace.  However, this 
possibility should serve as a caution against any international intervention which would 
serve as a substitute for (or more likely, augment) military spending by Juba.   
   As shown in the previous section, even if neither actor has an interest in going to 
war, both actors have an incentive for military expenditure to reduce their opponent’s 
gains and make conflict as costly for their opponent as possible.  This rationale explains 
the very high levels of military spending by both the GNU and GoSS
19.  According to the 
World Bank’s 2007 Public Expenditure Review (PER) for Sudan, the GNU’s expenditure 
for defense and national security in 2006 was 325.6 billion Sudanese Dinar (1.175 billion 
US$).  This represented 19.8% of total government expenditure for the GNU.  Security 
expenditures for GoSS in 2006 were 555 million US$, representing 41.7% of the South’s 
government expenditures
20.   As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, even if Khartoum has no 
interest or intention of going to war, it has every incentive to maintain a credible threat of 
war to ensure that Juba will choose unity in the referendum.  Likewise, even if Juba has 
nothing to gain from conflict, it must make conflict as costly as possible for Khartoum to 
prefer peace over war if peaceful partition is to be a real strategic option for Juba
21.  
Unfortunately, this is the logic of conflict; non-productive military expenditure is a 
                                                 
19 For example, a recent ICG (2008) report argues that (p. 1),” having concluded that it cannot rely on the 
guarantors, the SPLM has been building up its military capacity, which many members consider its only 
realistic leverage over the NCP, as well as developing alliances with marginalized movements and rebel 
factions within Darfur, Kordofan, the East and the far North.” 
20 Figures from the CPA Monitor for the 2007 budgets are different and may reflect changes in spending 
from 2006 to 2007 as well as differing definitions.  The CPA Monitor lists the total budget for the security 
sector for the GNU at US$375 million.  Military spending for GoSS is listed as US$592 million.  These 
statistics are the most readily available and most accurate, though discrepancies clearly exist.   The PER 
figures are consistent with the CIA World Factbook estimate of Sudan’s military expenditure of 3% of 
GDP (which would suggest US$ 1.13 billion spending on defense for GNU in 2006).   
21 For an analysis of military expenditure as a cause, not an effect, of post-conflict relapse into violence, see 
Collier and Hoeffler (2006). 
  17perfectly rational response even when both actors might benefit from spending less on 
security (Hirshleifer, 1991, Skaperdas, 1996).   
This relationship is graphically represented in Figure 3, in which indifference 
curves (U
*) for both actors are shown and the current equilibrium determined by military 
expenditures, M
* for each actor.  We assume diminishing returns to military expenditure 
and constant costs for military spending resulting in indifference curves that are concave 
in military expenditure
22.  These assumptions reflect the geographical and fixed nature of 
the resources (R) to be divided by conflict – given an opponents military expenditure, the 
first percentile of R arranged in ease of appropriation would be less costly to secure than 
the 99
th.   
Lower military expenditure by an opponent increases the utility for an actor, 
therefore the indifference curve U′ represents higher payoffs for Khartoum than that of 
U
*.  Though Khartoum might want to decrease military expenditure, this would only 
result in decreased payoffs (a lower valued indifference curve, farther away from the MK 
axis), assuming that Juba will maintain expected military expenditure of M
*
J.  The 
indifference curves and similar constraints hold for Juba, causing Juba to maintain M
*
J.  
The optimal solution for each actor is a vector of responses which are represented by a 
response curve not shown in the figure.  In the unique Nash equilibrium, both actors 
maximize their military expenditure taking into account constant costs of military 
expenditure and respond to their opponents expected expenditures – thus the Nash 
equilibrium shown is the intersection of the best response functions for both actors. 
                                                 
22 For example, a simple ratio form contest success function δ=μMK/(μMK +MJ), where μ is a decisiveness 
parameter that determines the effectiveness of military spending by Khartoum relative to Juba is used to 
represent δ, the share of R secured through military action.  Maximizing utility for both actors results in 
equilibrium levels of military spending for both actors of M*K=M*J=μR/(1+μ)
2   These results and the best 
response functions for both actors result in concave utility functions for both actors, like those in Figure 3.      





J.  This tension between the incentive to invest in the military while avoiding 
escalation, creates the backdrop against which both actors can invest in their military 






J} is a unique equilibrium solution, Figure 3 demonstrates that the 
inclination of both actors is to increase military spending given their opponent’s 
expenditure.  This equilibrium holds because at M
*  marginal value of military 
expenditure is equal to the cost - diminishing returns keeps each actor from trying to 
move to U
′ from U
*.   Figure 3 also demonstrates that this equilibrium level of 















Figure 3:  Military Expenditures and Outcomes under 
Assumption of War 
  19indifference curves by decreasing military expenditures (southwest of the equilibrium 
solution).  Because military expenditure is non-productive, both actors would prefer to 
divide the prize from conflict with minimal military expenditure.  However, because 
neither actor can credibly commit to these lower levels of military expenditure, such an 
equilibrium cannot be reached.  We return to this issue when we discuss how 
democratization can serve as a commitment device allowing both actors to reach 
preferred outcomes with lower military expenditure.   
In addition to excessive military expenditure by both sides, another reflection of 
this “race to the bottom” is evident in the extremely slow formation of the Joint 
Integrated Units (JIUs), a force of nearly 40,000 personnel, mandated by the CPA and 
intended to be formed out of equal parts from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) troops.  While the JIUs were defined by the 
CPA in 2005, formation of Joint Military Teams (JMTs) and nomination of forces to 
serve in the JIUs fell behind schedule, missing the scheduled deployment for October 
2006.  To place the size of this force into perspective, the SAF has approximately 
105,000 total active troops and the SPLA consists of 20,000 to 30,000 active troops 
(Military Balance, 2007).  As a result, the full verification and deployment of a unity 
force less than one third of the size of the total fighting forces available to both sides, 
remains behind schedule.  Though there is some hope as limited progress has been made 
recently (see UN Security Council Resolution 1784).  
Unfortunately, reported military expenditure is not likely to reflect the full range 
of options exploited by both sides to increase the cost of war for the other.  For example, 
Khartoum has historically exploited tribal differences within the South by training, 
  20arming and financing militias from Southern Sudanese tribes that have been historically 
non sympathetic to the SPLM.  This is has been a bone of contention between the NCP 
and the SPLM, which demanded the dissolution of these militias.  On the other hand, the 
SPLM has been able to mobilize allies from the so called transitional regions of Southern 
Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile, which are part of the North.  Military Balance 
estimates the size of the paramilitary “Popular Defense Force” as 17,500 active with 
85,000 reservists
23.  In addition, the more populous and powerful Arab nomadic tribes in 
South Darfur (who have largely not been part of the Darfur conflict)
24 and Kordofan are 
likely to be drawn into the conflict against the SPLA in the context of a dispute on 
Abeyei or other border areas
25.   In these respects, investments in alliances can be likened 
to military spending, decreasing the costs of conflict for each actor and increasing the 
possible gains.  Indeed, this brinksmanship is apparent in Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir’s October mobilization of some of these allied forces, “Now we order the Popular 
Defense Force (PDF), the legitimate son of the people, to open their camps and gather 
their mujaheddin” to which he added that the purpose of this call was “not to wage war” 
but that “it is obvious we should be ready” (IWPR, 2008).  This, corroborates the main 
premise of our model as President al-Bashir, representing Khartoum, has an incentive to 
signal a strong willingness for conflict even if he has no intention of going to war. 
 
                                                 
23 Recent reports suggest that the Janjawid in Darfur may be being assimilated into the Popular Defense 
Forces, suggesting that measures of total military expenditures and force size in the north may not reflect 
actual strength of Khartoum (Winter and Pendergast, 2008).  How and whether these forces would be 
employed in conflict with the South is unclear. 
24 See for example, Flint and De Waal (2005). 
25 Indeed, the recent bloody skirmishes (January and February 2008) between the SPLA and the Messeriya 
tribesmen over grazing lands around Abyei and Abak is a testimony to this potential conflict. For details on 
these events, see the Media Monitoring Reports from the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 
specifically January 7 and February 24, 2008. 
  212.2 Incomplete Information 
  The previous section demonstrated that in the referendum model with complete 
information equilibrium solutions depend on the expected costs and gains associated with 
war, even if neither actor has an interest in going to war.  Under the assumptions for the 
previous sections, war is never an equilibrium, since both actors have a preference for 
peace and can respond to the predicted behavior of the other actor.  Now we relax our 
assumption on complete information of the payoffs, allowing for incomplete and 
asymmetric information on the gains from conflict (δ).  As shown in the previous section, 
only the relative values of the costs and gains of conflict are important for determining 
the equilibrium solutions, therefore, it is assumed here that the only incomplete 
information is in the gains from (δR) associated with conflict (Juba: Partition; Khartoum: 
War)
26.   
  For simplicity, we assume two possible values for the gains from conflict, referred 
to as δLow and δHigh.  Unlike the analysis from the previous section, here we hold military 
expenditures by both sides fixed, so that neither actor has the ability to change the 
payoffs from war and must respond strategically to given payoffs.  δLow is defined such 
that the gains from conflict less the costs of conflict are negative.  δHigh is defined such 
that the gains from conflict, less the costs of conflict are positive, yet not so high that 
unity is no longer attractive to Khartoum (the preference for peace still binds).  Formally, 
these assumptions imply: 
   δLow R< γMJ and  γMJ +(R/2)> δHigh R  > γMJ 
 
                                                 
26 Clearly the model would be more realistic if this assumption was relaxed and more of the parameters 
included incomplete information, however, the results would be unnecessarily complicated without 
significant gains in understanding the relationship between the two actors.  
  22The state of δ, is determined randomly by “nature” before the game begins with 
probability (p) that δLow is chosen.  This implies that the probability of being in the δHigh 
state of nature is (1-p).  It is assumed that the information is asymmetric: Juba knows the 
probability of being in each state, but not the actual state, while Khartoum knows the 
probability and the actual state of nature.   
This incomplete information is represented by the dashed line between the choice 
nodes for Juba, indicating that Juba does not know if it is playing the δLow or δHigh sub-
game (Figure 4).  Because δ is not a component of the Peace or Unity payoffs, the state of 
δ only affects the War payoffs for both actors.  Thus, with the exception of the two 
possible states of δ, the incomplete information game in Figure 4 is identical to that of the 
extended form game in Figure 1. 





Juba B+(1-δHigh)R- γMK -MJ 
War 
Peace 
Khartoum   A-MK 















Prob(Low δ) = p  Prob(High δ) = (1-p) 
War 
Juba B+(1-δLow)R- γMK -MJ 
Figure 4:  Extensive Form Model of Referendum and 
Response with Incomplete Information 
  
If Juba chooses Unity, the state of nature does not matter (the payoffs are the 
same regardless of the state of nature).  However, if Juba chooses Partition, the 
possibility of being in a low or high state affects Khartoum’s response, therefore 
backwards induction with probabilistic expectations can still be used to find the equilibria 
for the sequential game, even though Juba doesn’t know which game is being played.   
  24Following the same logic as in the previous section, Khartoum will respond to 
Partition with War if the δHigh sub-game is being played and will respond with Peace if 
the δLow sub-game is being played.  Thus, if Juba chooses Partition without knowledge of 
the state of nature it can expect a payoff of:  p(B+R-MJ)+(1-p)( B+(1-δHigh)R- γMK -MJ).  
If this payoff is compared to the payoff from Unity, Juba will prefer Partition, even at the 
risk of war, provided that R(1-2(1-p)δHigh)>2γMK(1-p).  Ceteris paribus, as p increases the 
likelihood of being in a δLow state increases and Juba is more likely to benefit from 
Partition. 
The preference calculation is simple and fairly straightforward, but Juba’s 
decision is non-trivial.  While there are implicit assumptions that Juba is risk neutral and 
that the payoffs truly reflect the cost of conflict, it should be noted that the decision for 
Partition by Juba is accompanied by an ex ante (1-p) probability that Khartoum will 
respond with War.  Here, even if both actors prefer Unity to War under the preference for 
peace, it is still possible for war to occur if the payoff to Juba from Partition is 
sufficiently high. 
While this version of the model is fairly similar to the basic one presented at the 
beginning of the paper, it is evident that the introduction of asymmetric and incomplete 
information is costly for the actor with less information and can be costly for both actors. 
If Juba was guaranteed complete information about the state of nature it could use 
backwards induction and calculate the ex ante payoff from playing this game.  This ex 
ante payoff would be the sum of the probability weighted payoffs from each equilibrium 
that follows from each state of nature.  Moving the expectations operator through these 
probability weighted outcomes yields B+R((1+p)/2)-MJ, which exceeds the unity payoff 
  25by (p/2)R, a premium Juba would be willing to pay for this information if they were 
concerned about going to war (i.e. if they are not risk neutral).  
  The value of this information to Juba and the possibility that asymmetric 
information might contribute to war, even when neither actor’s first best solution is war, 
suggests that more complete information might benefit both actors.  Unfortunately, in this 
one shot game (there will only be one referendum in 2011) a credible signal on the state 
of nature cannot be sent by Khartoum.  With incomplete and asymmetric information, 
there is the possibility that the state of nature is δHigh and that Juba still chooses Partition, 
to which Khartoum responds with War.  While both actors would prefer Unity to war in 
this case, Khartoum cannot credibly signal the state of nature, because it always has an 
incentive to signal that the state of nature is δHigh.  The earlier quotation by President al-
Bashir reflects the incentives for Khartoum to signal this strength.  
  The limitations on credible signals from Khartoum and the value of more 
complete information are both part of the dilemma of a continued peace in Sudan.  Still, 
this analysis suggests an area for possible contribution by an international community 
interested in securing the peace between Juba and Khartoum.  The game of incomplete 
information shown here is just one example of the many ways in which incomplete 
information could result in war when neither actor prefers war.  More complete 
information provided to both actors could reduce the probability of unwanted conflict.  
To that end, the mapping exercises, explicit resolution of Abyei border issues and the 
CPA mandated census which has fallen behind schedule and is now planned for early 
2008 could contribute to better informed strategy choices (policymaking) from actors in 
both the North and the South.  All of these activities would contribute to a more explicit 
  26and transparent assessment of the size of the parameters described in the model, including 
non-oil revenues, oil revenues and the number and location of citizens, statistics which 
would contribute to a better understanding of the costs of conflict. Likewise, more 
extensive transparency in government and military expenditures by both actors (verified 
by third parties) following the example already set by the CPA Monitor could contribute 
to more complete information and reduce the likelihood of unwanted conflict.  
  Additionally, note that asymmetric information was assumed here for 
convenience, not to reflect the actual conditions on the ground in Sudan.  If, more 
realistically, we assume that each side faces uncertainty about the other’s expected gains 
from going to war and that each can increase military expenditures, then, given some 
very reasonable assumptions on the parameters, Khartoum could have an incentive to 
increase its military spending to discourage Juba from opting for partition, while Juba 
might want to build up its military power to deter Khartoum from responding to partition 
with war. If there is any dynamic feedback from observed military spending to actual 
military spending, this could result in an “arms race” that could be quite dangerous in a 
situation in which both actors do not know the other’s payoff associated from war (and 
have incentives to signal that the payoffs are high). Military spending may in fact lead to 
a situation in which the actors’ preference for peace is overcome and they prefer to go to 
war regardless of the other’s actions. In addition, the existence of private information and 
incentives to misrepresent that information can lead to war through another causal 
mechanism, which does not require overcoming the preference for peace. Both actors 
may start feeling threatened by the other’s military spending, perceived as aggressive, 
  27and may consider the opportunity of launching a preventive attack if they think that their 
chances for success are better in the present than at the end of the “arms race”
27.   
 
3.  Democratization as a Commitment Device: The Upcoming 2009 
Elections 
 
  Recent research of elections in post-conflict states suggests that elections 
following a peace agreement are accompanied by higher risk of conflict relapse (Collier, 
Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2007).  In addition, several studies have found that 
democratizing states tend to be especially war prone when they do not have strong 
institutions at the moment of political transition (see in particular Snyder, 2000, and 
Mansfield and Snyder, 2005).   In the absence of strong institutions, electoral politics in 
transitional countries tend to be hijacked by opportunistic politicians that use nationalistic 
and ethnic rhetoric to win votes thus increasing the risk of violent conflict, both at home 
and abroad.  However, we believe that this scenario is less likely in Sudan as the 
foundations already exist for non-factional democratization because the CPA and the new 
interim constitution enacted after the signing of the agreement have laid the foundation 
for a participatory federalized democracy.  
Moreover, reneging on obligations to the peace agreement by the NCP or SPLM 
is likely to be very costly for both actors, due to the presence of active political parties 
and civil society organization in both North and South.  The political landscape in Sudan 
today is extremely dynamic involving historical parties with substantial popular base, 
such as the Umma Party, as well as aggressive regional political movements in the so 
                                                 
27 See Fearon (1995) for a theoretical discussion of private information and incentives to misrepresent it as 
a cause of war.  
  28called “marginalized” North, such as Darfur.  Also, the SPLM is also likely to face a 
vigorous contest from a combination of smaller historical parties and other community-
based movements.  In addition, Sudan has a legacy of democratic rule that during its 
short rein in power (1956-58, 1964-69, 1985-89), and despite the civil war, had afforded 
the country a decent degree of political competition and political rights, well above the 
median for SSA (Figures 5 and 6).   However, following the coup in 1989, Sudan became 
a restricted, factional authoritarian state according to the Polity IV dataset.  This lasted 
until recently when it graduated to a restricted competition state since 2002, reflecting the 
diminishing capacity of the NCP to control political opposition and the strengthening role 
of political parties that transcend ethnic factions.  The increasing role of such parties is 
important because recent evidence suggests that while non-factional democratization 
promotes peace and development, winner-take-all factional democratization is strongly 
correlated with political violence and underdevelopment (Bodea and Elbadawi, 2006, 
2007). 
As a measure of political competition (Polity IV) suggests, despite some 
improvements following the cessation of hostilities and the start of the peace 
negotiations, the regime is still very authoritarian, in absolute sense as well as relative to 
the median Africa country (Figure 5).   Despite having identical polity scores in 1989 and 
1990, the democratization path for Sub-Saharan Africa diverged over the 1990s and a 
sizeable gap of approximately 8 points in polity remains between Sudan and the median 
African state.   




















































  The divergence in democratization is also apparent in the measure of political 
rights compiled by Freedom House (the Gastil Index, shown in Figure 6).  Despite similar 
levels of political rights in the late 1980s and early 1990s, political progress in Sub-
Saharan Africa has resulted in the median SSA country being termed “partially free”.  
Meanwhile, the people of Sudan are considered “Not Free” by the Freedom House index 
of political rights. 
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Figure 6: Sudan's Democratic Performance vis-a-vis the Median Sub-Saharan Country (1972-


























Note: The index ranges from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). 









































Given the current state of democracy and the legacy of political oppression, it might not 
be realistic to expect fundamental change in the level of democracy in the next three 
years.  Still, we contend that  free and fair elections in 2009 (as mandated by the CPA) 
that would lead to more democratic governments in both Khartoum and Juba would more 
accurately reflect the interests and will of all of the people of Sudan, including the 
interests of Juba.   
We contend that because both actors (especially Khartoum) face a credibility 
constraint, even limited democratization in the upcoming election could serve as a useful 
commitment device and resolve some of the credibility issues that are currently 
contributing to excessive militarization by both actors and the possibility of unwanted 
  31conflict.  Khartoum enjoys the privilege of acting last in the sequential game and 
therefore, the benefits accruing to a credible threat and the limitations of non-credible 
signals both fall primarily on Khartoum.  Therefore, the following model considers the 
impact of increasing the credibility of Khartoum through limited democratization.  This 
extension of the political franchise could result in credible commitments to limited 
militarization and a peaceful partition or, perhaps even unity, which would otherwise be 
impossible
28.  To reflect this, the sequential game from Figure 3 is expanded to allow for 
another stage, namely an election, in the model presented in Figure 6.   
  In the model of referendum and response with an election, Khartoum acts first, 
deciding whether to have a free and fair election resulting in limited democracy or 
whether to have an election without democratization, resulting in the continued 
authoritarian status quo.  If Khartoum democratizes, then both actors enter the democracy 
sub-game.  However if Khartoum does not democratize, it maintains the ability to 
respond to partition as in the previous models, so the expected result is as follows from 
the basic game presented in Figure 1.  
We assume that under democratization, all of the actors are able to share 
information and are able to negotiate a credible reduction in level of militarization in the 
North and the South.  This would have to follow the process of a very real 
democratization, not simply democratization in name, wherein all actors would engage 
within the political system to resolve these very pressing issues.  Ignoring for the moment 
all of the other possible fruits of such an outcome, assume that this democracy focuses on 




J represent military 
                                                 
28 Here we follow Jack and Lagunoff (2006) and Gehlbach and Keefer (2008) in arguing that 
democratization can serve as a commitment device for otherwise non-credible elites. 
  32expenditure under democratization.  This new, negotiated and credible level of military 















Figure 7:  Military Expenditures and Outcomes under 











We assume that an agreement can be reached under democratization is equivalent to or 











































J.    
These payoffs are shown in Figure 8, where the sub-game without democratization is 
substituted by the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria determined in the first model.   
  33Figure 8:  Extensive Form Model of Referendum and 
Response with an Election 
 
  Under these assumptions, the solution for the democratization game is similar to 
that of the non-democratization game, with some very important distinctions.  If the level 
of democratization is such that this level of militarization is credible on both sides, then 
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  34democratization would be pareto preferred by both actors
29.  Additionally, in the event of 
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K).  Also, if 
democratization can contribute to control of the military spending, such a solution would 
decrease the likelihood of an arms race and the possibility of both actors engaging in a 
preventive war that follows due to commitment problems.  
 
4.  Simulations:  Some Estimates of the Parameters 
 
  Here we provide some basic estimates of the parameters following from the few 
statistics available.  This numbers are very rough and should be taken as such.  They are 
intended to provide a brief glance at the models and payoffs for both actors and it is 
hoped that they will contribute to the ongoing dialogue between the actors and the 
international community on the true costs of war and peace for the Sudan. 
 
Table 2:  Estimates of Terms in Payoffs (2007)  
(all figures are in million $, except number of troops) 
      GNU GoSS 
Total revenue  5,546
a 1,419
b 
Non-oil revenue  3,416
c  (A) 65
d (B) 
Oil revenue  2,130
e 1,354
f 
Total Contested Oil 
Revenue (R) 
2749.6 




Defense and security +  





i 122,300  25,000 
GDP 46,708 
                                                 
29 Here, a critical reader may argue that the assumption on unitary actors is unreasonable, as the payoffs for 
the elites in Khartoum are not necessarily aligned with those of the rest of the North.  Similarly, the 
decision of southern nationalists that might commit to war may not reflect the payoffs of the population of 
the South. Still it is in this political space, in light of the gains from democratization and demilitarization, 
where real negotiations with the elites in Khartoum could begin, bringing their objective functions into 
alignment with the rest of the population of the North.  (We are indebted to Stephen Ndegwa for thoughtful 
commentary on these issues). 
  35Cost of war  49,011
j 
Sources: World Bank, Public Expenditure Review 2007; IMF, World Economic Outlook 2007; CIA, World 
Factbook 2007;  Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report 2008; International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Military Balance 2007.  
a. Net of oil revenue transfers to the GOSS (US$1362m). May include grants, unspecified in 2006 World Bank Public 
Expenditure Review for Sudan. 
b. This figure includes US$1331m reported in the GoSS budget and US$87.6m, reported in the GNU  
budget as oil revenue transfers to Southern oil-producing states (i.e., Unity and Upper Nile). The two figures were summed 
up for comparability with GNU revenues, which include sums to be transferred to Northern states.  Total contested oil 
revenue is twice the value of transfers from GNU to GoSS plus transfers to oil-producing states. 
c.This figure probably includes donor grants. 
d. This figure includes donor grants (US$63m) and GOSS tax revenue (US$2m). 
e. Net of oil revenue transfers to the GOSS. 
f. This figure includes the oil revenue reported in the GOSS budget (US$1266m) and the oil revenues transferred by  
the GNU to the oil-producing Southern states (US$88m). 
g. This section of GOSS budget expenditures is called "Security". US$552m out of US$555m were allocated to the SPLA. 
h. For the GNU this row corresponds to the sum of amounts spent for "Defense and National Security" and for "Public 
order and safety". For the GoSS this row corresponds to the sum of "Security" and "Rule of Law". 
i. The figure for the GNU includes 104,800 regular troops and 17,500 paramilitary troops. The figure reported for the GOSS 
is in the middle range of the estimated strength of the SPLA (20,000-30,000). 
j. The cost of war is calculated as the net present value of forgone economic growth, which has been estimated by Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004) as equivalent to 105% of current GDP, assuming a war that last seven years and fourteen years of 
recovery. The GDP figure used for the calculation is the IMF estimate for Sudan's 2007 GDP. 
 
 
The source used for all revenue and expenditure information in Table 2 is the World 
Bank’s Public Expenditure Review for the year 2006. The figures on military forces are 
from the Military Balance (2007). We use Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) findings to 
estimate the overall cost of the conflict. They found that on average the discounted cost 
of civil war is equal to about 105 percent of GDP at the start of the conflict.
30      
Table 2 begs the question of the sustainability of these levels of military 
expenditure in the event of partition.  Without US$1331m in oil revenues for Khartoum, 
it is difficult to conceive that they would be able to continue to spend US$1175m on 
defense and military (34% of $3416m non-oil government revenues), though security 
concerns, such as the one in Darfur, may necessitate high military expenditure.       
Similarly, while some degree of “catch-up” military expenditure is understandable in the 
                                                 
30 Part of the cost is incurred during the conflict, because the war on average reduces growth by 2 percent 
of GDP. After the conflict, the cost is represented by the fact that it takes long time (on average 14 years) 
for the economy to recover completely from the shock; during this period, the GDP is lower than it would 
have otherwise been without conflict. This is a conservative measure of the costs of civil conflict because it 
does not account for the costs of loss of life and disability (Collier, Chauvet and Hegre, 2007). The negative 
externalities associated with spill-over of conflict (e.g., refugee flows, communication of diseases and 
terrorism) are not taken into consideration here, because we are interested in the costs of conflict that are 
directly borne out by Juba and Khartoum.   
  36South, annual expenditures of US$555m with current non-oil revenues of only $60m 
suggest that a large percentage of any significant military expenditure in the future 
necessitates control of oil wealth.  Average military expenditure as a percentage of 
government expenditure for most low and middle income countries is 14-15%.   To place 
these expenditures in perspective, we run estimates of military expenditure per capita and 
per soldier for a panel of 91 developing countries from 1990 to 2005.  We predict 
expenditures for these countries, controlling for the variables reported in Appendix Table 
1, including GDP per capita, population, area of the country, level of democracy and 
whether the country is landlocked
31.  In Figure 9 we report the predicted and residual 
military expenditure per soldier for only those countries with positive residuals in all four 
models from Appendix Table 1.  
Figure 9: Military Expenditure per Soldier













































































































































                                                 
31 In addition to the variables above, we control for the scale of the conflict (battledeaths), size of the 
peacekeeping force following end of civil wars, share of value of exports due to oil and minerals, and 
squared variables for population and area.  None of these variables were significant determinants of 
military expenditure per soldier or per capita, and were therefore left out of the parsimonious models 
reported in appendix table 1.  However, it is possible that some of these relatively time-invariant effects 
(such as the dummy variable for civil war) are accounted for by fixed-effects. 
   
  37Each bar reflects total military expenditure per soldier in each country for 2005 
(2007 in the case of Sudan), including the predicted element of this expenditure and the 
unpredicted element reflected by the residual.  Colombia, Iran and Sudan clearly exhibit 
very high military expenditure per soldier.  Additionally, approximately $8,000 per 
soldier for Sudan is unexplained by the model.  Similarly, some of the expenditure for 
India, Iran, Mali and Zambia is unexplained by the model, suggesting that all of these 
countries spend more on the military than the model would predict.  Likewise, military 
expenditure per capita is reflected in Figure 10. 
Figure 10: Military Expenditure per Capita














































































































































   
In Figure 10, Sudan has high levels of military expenditure per capita exceeded 
only by Colombia, Iran and Morocco and nearly half of this expenditure is unexplained 
by the model.  Again, the comparator countries for both Figures 9 and 10 are those 
countries with positive residuals in all four models in Appendix Table 1, so this reflects 
high levels of unexpected military spending even among those countries with high 
residuals.   
  38While the table and figures above demonstrates unsustainable and unpredicted 
levels of military expenditure by Juba and Khartoum, Table 3 below shows how this 
military expenditure has substantial opportunity costs in terms of development.  Progress 
on most of the Millennium Development Goals is not likely to be “on track” even for the 
peaceful and relatively better off states in the North, much less in the South, where the 
ten Southern states are demonstrably lagging in progress in all indicators behind their 
counterparts in the North and the mean for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Table 3:  Development Indicators, Sudan vis-à-vis Sub-Saharan Africa 

















Net primary school 
attendance rate (%)  100 (by 2015)   67  17  47  69 
Ratio of girls to boys 
attending 
primary education  1 (by 2005)   0.91  0.76  0.85  0.89 
Measles immunization 
coverage (%) 
2   73 43  61  64 
Proportion of births attended 
by 
skilled personnel (%) 
3  70 33  55  44 
Contraceptive prevalence (%) 
2  9 4  7  23 
Proportion of population 
using effective malaria 
prevention measures (%) 
2  32 22  28  N.A. 
Use of improved drinking 
water (%)  77.5 (by 2015)   55  62  58  56 
Use of improved sanitation 
facilities (%)   38  7 26  37 
Source: Sudan Household Health Survey (2006), World Development Indicators (2007). 
1 Simple averages are used for all indicators.  Averages reported in the Sudan Household Health Survey are weighted 
by state, however, reliable estimates of weighted state populations are not available for use in calculation here. 
2. The goal is to halt by 2015 and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and the prevalence of malaria and other 
major diseases.  
3. The goal is to reduce 1990 maternal mortality by 
two thirds.        
 
  39Of course, the development impact of a reallocation of funds from military spending to 
development initiatives would strongly depend upon improvements in Sudan’s policies 
and institutions.  Several studies have found a statistically significant positive relationship 
between government health spending and MDG health outcomes (such as, reduction of 
under-five mortality and maternal mortality ratio) for countries with good governance 
and institutions; on the other hand, the relationship appears not significant for poorly-
governed countries.
32  
Sudan’s current levels of governance do not offer much hope for improved 
development outcomes as a consequence of a reduction of military expenditures: the 
country scores 2.5 in the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) index (ranging from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 6) and 1 in the Political 
Risk Services Group’s index of bureaucratic quality (ranging from a minimum of 1 to a 
maximum of 6). However, if the democratic political reforms envisioned above actually 
take place, it would be reasonable to expect a general improvement in governance 
standards.   
  For the following two scenarios, we assume improvements in quality of 
bureaucracy and institutions.  We take an extremely conservative approach, assuming 
that 25% of total unexplained military expenditures of the average from the four models 
in Appendix Table 1 ($ 219 million) is used for public health expenditures.  According to 
the World Development Indicators (2007) public health expenditure in Sudan is only 
1.4% of GDP, whereas military expenditures are 3.7% of GDP.  Shifting the $219 million 
from military expenditure would result in a 33.5% increase in public health expenditure.  
                                                 
32 See, for example, World Bank (2004) and Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002).    
 
  40The results of such shifts suggest the following improvements in health indicators and, 
while data on impact is sparse, the implication is that similar shifts away from military 
spending and into social development would have similar impacts: 
1)  If for example, the quality of the bureaucracy were to improve from 1 to 3.7, 
results from Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) predict that a 10% increase in 
health expenditure could lead to a 4.5% reduction of under-five mortality.  In 
our case, the hypothesized increase of 33.5% in public health expenditures 
would lead to a 15% decline in under-five mortality (from 89 deaths per 1000 
live births to 76 (WDI, 2006)).  
2)  If the CPIA were to improve from 2.5 to 3.25, results in World Bank (2004) 
predict that a 10% increase in health expenditures could lead to a 6.95% 
decline in maternal mortality ratio.  Thus, a 33.5% increase in public health 
expenditures could conceivably lead to a 23% reduction in maternal mortality 
ratio (from 450 deaths per 100,000 live births to 346.5, (WDI, 2005)). 
These predictions are out of sample estimates and must be used with caution.  Still, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that 25% of the unexplained military spending could be 
diverted to productive development activities and realize the improvements above.  These 
numbers demonstrate how little movement is necessary by both actors to find a more 
productive peace and the very real opportunity cost in terms of human development 
foregone to ongoing, high levels of military expenditure.   
5.  Extensions:  Changes to the Payoffs 
  While many of the parameters are given by the CPA, such as oil-revenue sharing 
arrangements and the nature of the referendum, not all of the payoffs are set in stone.  
  41While both actors may have an incentive to invest in conflict technology to force a 
preferred equilibrium as shown above, it is also possible that the two actors (and other 
interested parties) might invest in infrastructure to affect the payoffs as well.   
 
5.1 Enhancing Economic Interdependence and Complementarity between North and 
South  
 
The economies and societies of the North and South are already linked through, among 
other things, the presence of large communities of Southern Sudanese in Northern Sudan; 
and, the presence of large nomadic Northern tribes in the South for extended time during 
summer in search for water and pasture.  Moreover, the complementarities and 
interdependence between the two economies are manifest in the oil pipeline transporting 
oil produced in the south to ports on the Red Sea in the North; the networks of railroad, 
roads and river transport linking the two regions; and, the active trade between the two 
regions.   Investments to further deepen and expand economic interdependence during the 
interim period prior to the 2011 referendum might all contribute to another parameter, 
called “C” which could contribute an additive effect to unity payoffs.  This could be 
reflected by changes in the payoffs under Unity.   
 
 Khartoum    A+(R/2)+C 
 Juba     B+(R/2)+C
 
 
   For positive values of C, the complementarities from cooperation result in gains 
from unity that are conceivably greater than what either actor could expect from a 
peaceful partition.  If investments in these areas can actually contribute to higher payoffs 
for both actors, then both Khartoum and Juba must consider weighing the marginal 
benefits of military expenditures against the effects of benefits associated with unity.    
  42  Even in the event of a partition vote, large gains form economic cooperation
33 
might motivate Khartoum not to respond militarily, because the payoff from economic 
cooperation might be higher than the net gains the military option: 
 
A+C-MK> A+ δR- γMJ -MK .   
 
Moreover, to the extent that the benefits of cooperation are perceived to be very 
substantial by the SPLM to the extent of providing some concessions at the margin, the 
following possibilities might be considered. 
5.2 A Cooperative Confederate Option 
In the event that unity turns out to be difficult to attain, a confederation between North 
and South provide a middle of the road option that would underpin cooperation, while 
allowing the Southern Sudanese to retain full control on their oil and other resources of 
interest
34.   A confederate system would underpin deeper cooperation on all of the areas 
of complementarities discussed above, most notably on the oil sector, where the southern 
Sudan oil could continue to be exported through the existing pipeline in a context of a 
broader cooperation that could also allow the North to retain a marginal share of the oil 
revenues.  In this case the payoffs from peaceful cooperation for both Khartoum (and 
Juba) could be high enough to discourage a military option (or a pure partition): 
 
Khartoum: (A+ θ R) + C - MK >A+ δR- γMJ -MK,  
Juba:        [B+ (1-θ )R] + C
 - MJ >B+ R- MJ, where θ < min{1/2, δ}  
                                                 
33 The gains from cooperation may be smaller under partition; this is easily modeled by introducing a 
parameter less than 1 for scaling the effects of cooperation.  This parameter is excluded from the analysis 
for simplicity. 
34 Admittedly this presents a constitutional challenge because it would require amending the CPA to allow 
for this option in the referendum.  However, it might not be a far fetched option, since some leaders of the 
SPLM have recently floated the idea as a possibility that they might consider. 
  435.3 A Neutral Abyei Zone as an Investment in Peace 
Under this arrangement, Abyei will be a neutral self-governing region, with full control 
of its oil and natural resources by its Dinka Nkong and the Messeriya inhabitants.   
Despite their inherent conflicts, among other things over water and grazing lands, these 
two communities have had a long history of cooperative relationship
35.   Moreover, given 
that, according to recent estimates, the Abyei oil reserves are not likely to be substantial, 
such arrangement would entail a relatively small compromise but high payoffs to both 
sides.  It would not only put off a major potential flashpoint of conflict but it could 
influence the overall relationship between North and South.  The groundwork for this 
solution may be being set in the Abyei Roadmap (see footnote 4). 
5.4 The Potential Role of the International Community 
The international community has an important role to play in this strategic interaction 
between Khartoum and Juba. By committing to support the outcome of the referendum, 
the international community could reduce Khartoum’s prospective benefits from war 
(δR) while increasing its costs (γMJ), thus reducing the probability of the North’s violent 
reaction in case the South opts for independence.   Care must be taken, however, to 
ensure that offers of military support are carefully crafted to support the peace, as any 
offer that augments or supplements either actors military spending could effectively 
contribute to that actor’s preference for war, overriding the preference for peace and 
possibly contributing to the arms race and preventive war by both parties.  Even given 
security guarantees such as “Over the Horizon” guarantees of peace, it is also important 
                                                 
35 For example, a recent ICG report observes that,consistent with the cooperative tradition between the two 
communities, “many Misseriya and Ngok Dinka leaders have been working at the local level to safeguard 
the peace and prevent a larger conflict.  The SPLA/SAF Abyei Security Committee has been functioning 
well, and two local meetings between tribal leaders have taken place.” (2008: p. 10). 
  44that the international community recognize the need for some measure of democratization 
for a meaningful cooperation between Khartoum and Juba that should go beyond the 
NCP-SPLM to enfranchise the other popular political parties in the country.  In this 
context the international community should support solutions like the recent initiative by 
opposition parties, led by the Umma Party, aimed at negotiating with the NCP to forge a 
national consensus on elections and transition to democracy in return for a “safety net” 
for the NCP should it lose the election and national commitment to the full 
implementation of the CPA on the part of the winners to assure the SPLM.  Such 
extensions to the franchise that would increase political competition and break political 
duopoly inherent in the current situation is certainly more desirable than an election 
alliance between the NCP-SPLM conditional on full implementation of the CPA, as 
believed to have been proposed by the SPLM; or the alternative proposition of full 
implementation of the CPA conditional on an electoral alliance between the two as 
alleged to be the counter proposal from the NCP (ICG, 2008). 
A more credible and positive intervention on the payoffs for Juba and Khartoum 
would entail a complete package that includes measures to promote deep democratic 
transformation in North and South, decreases in military dependence and investments in 
economic interdependence.  The international community should help the achievement of 
a speedy and amicable resolution of the Darfur conflict; support a timely execution of a 
comprehensive and sound population census (scheduled for April 15-30, 2008), including 
by providing sufficient number of qualified international observers; and encourage the 
Sudanese political parties and civil societies to agree on an election law that meets 
international standards and to commit enough resources to ensure that the multi-levels 
  45elections are timely, transparent and fair
36.   The international community should also 
support capacity and institutional building as well as investments in social service and 
economic growth, including projects for the promotion of economic complementarities 
and interdependence between North and South, such as Abyei.  There is a growing 
consensus in the peace-building scholarship community that economic growth and 
credible public institutions are critical for both sustainable post conflict peace as well as 
for stable post-conflict democratization (e.g. Sambanis, 2008; Keefer, 2008). 
6.  Conclusion 
The simple game-theoretical model presented in this paper highlights risks of renewed 
violence in Sudan following the 2011 referendum as well as opportunities for conflict-
mitigating policy intervention. The South would opt for partition if it expects that the 
North will not respond with force.  The North in turn would acquiesce to partition if it 
expects a difficult and costly war to stop the southern bid for independence. Both sides 
have an incentive to increase their military spending, thus diverting scarce resources 
away from badly needed development initiatives.   
  In a situation of imperfect information (as in the real world), there is risk of war 
by miscalculation, even if both sides prefer the status-quo over renewed violence: the 
South could choose partition in the mistaken belief that the North would acquiesce. In 
addition, each side’s need to signal to the opponent military strength risks causing an 
“arms race” between the North and the South, which in turn could lead to a “security 
dilemma”. In this scenario, each actor may see the other’s efforts to arm as potentially 
aggressive and may be tempted to launch a preventive attack for fear of being attacked in 
                                                 
36 According to the CPA, elections should take place at six levels: the Presidency of the Government of 
National Unity, he Presidency of the Government of Southern Sudan, the National assembly in Khartoum, 
the Southern Sudan Legislative assembly in Juba, 25 States Legislature, and 25 States Governors. 
  46a moment of relative weakness. The international community, by promoting the 
completion of the CPA-mandated census and other technical issues related to the CPA-
mandated general elections of 2009 as well as by urging more transparency on both sides’ 
military expenditures can reduce information asymmetries and the risk of an arms race.  
In addition, the international community could decrease the risk of renewed violence by 
supporting a process of democratization of Sudanese politics (including the 2009 
elections).  Democratization is shown in the model to provide a useful commitment 
device and resolve some of the credibility issues that are currently contributing to 
excessive militarization by both sides and might result in unwanted and unintended 
conflict.  Democratization is also likely to have much more significant impact beyond its 
positive influence associated with reduced military expenditure.  A genuine democratic 
transformation might actually make unity attractive to Southern Sudanese; and even if the 
latter opted for partition, the two emerging democracies are likely to assign a higher 
value to economic interdependence and cooperation than any payoffs that might be 
reaped by conflicts and war.  The opportunity cost of miliatarization and conflict in terms 
of human development suggest that all actors have an incentive to create commitments 
for a lasting and credible peace.  Finally, the international community’s promotion of 
investment in crucial sectors (e.g., oil) could play an important role in increasing 
economic complementarities between North and South, thus potentially reducing the 
probability of both partition and war.  
 
     
 
  47Appendix Figure 1: 














































































Significance: *<5%, **<2%, *<1%. 
GDP per capita, Population and Area (sq km) from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2007). Here 
democracy is the composite polity score from the Polity IV index (Democracy-Autocracy+10).  In addition 
to the variables above, we included control variables in earlier models accounting for scale of the conflict 
(battledeaths), size of the peacekeeping force (SIPRI peacekeeping data), share of value of exports due to 
oil and minerals (WDI), and squared variables for population and area.  None of these latter variables were 
significant determinants of military expenditure per soldier or per capita, and were therefore left out of the 
parsimonious models reported above.  For fixed effects regressions, the number of countries in the panel is 
included in parentheses. 
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